Explore the future of US–China relations in ‘US and China: Where Will They Land?’ at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026, examining economic ties, geopolitical tensions and cooperation pathways.
At Davos 2026, panelists framed US–China ties as a long-term structural rivalry requiring pragmatic “management mechanisms” rather than a durable settlement. Graham Allison argued “Thucydides nailed it”: China’s rapid rise “discombobulat[es]” the order and magnifies miscalculation risks, while “mutual deterrence” after last year’s tariff and rare-earth standoff is producing tactical stability. Senator Chris Coons said bipartisan support exists for “clear eyed engagement,” but warned Trump’s ally-fraying tariffs and rollback of soft power “create opportunities” for Beijing; he highlighted AI as the most pressing domain, from jobs to military use. Zhao Hai criticized US “misperception” and “zero sum” thinking, urged “guidelines…framework…mechanisms,” and stressed fentanyl and investment rules as near-term bargaining terrain ahead of an April summit. Kevin Rudd urged “managed strategic competition” focused on “the three T’s, tariffs, technology and Taiwan,” noting China’s “unprecedented levels of…self-confidence” and Xi’s intent to “change the game.” Angela Zhang argued formal “agreements” are hard to draft and enforce, yet stability is likelier in 2026 as both sides understand “chokepoints” and seek economic breathing room. A recurring prescription was narrow, continuous, high-level diplomacy—private, candid channels—to avoid accidents, especially around Taiwan and AI.
We have a very, very esteemed panel here with us this evening. The context is obviously, I'm sure most of you would have been on or watched the address by President Trump barely hour and a half ago. I'm going to maybe make Professor Allison just give us a quick take. I'm sure everyone wants a quick take on that. And then I'll I'll go to each of the panelists thereafter with questions as well. After everyone's gotten through the first round of responses to my questions, I want to see where every time lands and commit to providing as much time as possible to the floor. One final question, perhaps for me to round up and hopefully get time. So, Professor.
Allison, if you could just give us a quick, quick take. Everyone likes quick takes these days on the president's speech just now and maybe how it applies to US-China relations, as you saw it.
Well, it went off in many different directions, as he's inclined to do. And, but there was one big message for the Europeans in particular, but for all of us, which is that after having threatened to do whatever was required to acquire Greenland, including using military force and even using mafioso language, that we're going to either do this the hard way or the easy way. He took the gun off the table and said, we're not going to use military force to coerce, Greenland or Denmark. Now, again, it's a pretty strange world in which an ally has been threatening to use military force against another ally. So that world we're already in. That fact is already occurred. But the fact that he took it off the table, I think, is a big and significant factor. Second point he made, though clear over and over, he is really serious about acquiring Greenland. And so the he says Greenland is just a big chunk of ice. It's relevant for the US and not particularly relevant for Denmark or for the Greenlanders. It's, he says, needed for American national security. Myself, I don't know the I cannot see the argument for that. But that's his claim. And that the Europeans have never been grateful to the US for all the things that we've done for them. And then he has a litany about the fact, which is roughly correct, that the US has essentially been the defensive shield for Europe ever since World War two, and the Europeans have been free riders to some considerable extent. So they owe us something. So they should remember all the good things we did for them. And what they could do for us is give us Greenland. And then he said, I'm still thinking this is going to work out okay. And if the Europeans find a way to fulfill my demand, I'll, I'll be grateful. And then he said, but if they don't, I'll remember.
Well, the thing that struck me, and I'm sure it struck you as well. And this will segue back into our topic for this evening, which is US-China relations. And where the two countries will land is how far he mentioned or didn't mention China, throughout this speech. In any case, let's get back to the topic at hand.
One footnote on that one. I think for those that especially since of China, so he only referred to 3 or 4 leaders in the whole speech. In the case of the Europeans, for both Macron and for the Canadian colleague Carney, he had very negative things to say, basically demeaning in effect. But when he said she, his eyes light up a little bit and he says, I have a great relationship with XI, I greatly respect XI. He's brilliant. So he was off on that track. So he clearly distinguishes between XI and his relationship with XI and his relationship with a country and a leader that happens to be our neighbor, Canada or France, which was the country that came to our rescue in the revolution. So I would say that's interesting. Just as we're trying to grade or gauge him on his relationships with other leaders.
So as we look to to what will happen this year, 2026, as far as we can and maybe a little bit beyond, it's quite stark that it's now sort of nine years since your book on the Thucydides Trap. And maybe if we frame how things have evolved since then, the first Trump administration, and then the Biden administration and now the second, the first year of the Trump administration, how have you seen, the US-China sort of dynamic evolve in that time? That will give you some sense of where we're headed in 2026?
I have a difficulty with professors because they they start talking, as one of my colleagues said, 50 minute soundbites. So let me just be very I would say Thucydides nailed nailed it. Okay. If we're trying to think about the relationship between the US and China, Thucydides insight is the central starting point. And that insight is that a rapidly rising China that seriously threatens America's a colossal ruling US and its position at the top of every pecking order. This, this basically shift, rapid shift in the seesaw of power is discombobulating the entire relationship. And actually the international order that was reflected before that and in ways, as Thucydides explained very well, that, make that magnify misunderstandings and multiply miscalculations and amplify incidents or accidents that would otherwise be inconsequential, that often ended a war. So I would say his pictures still right. These are structural realities that she now and Trump have to grapple, grapple with. And the promising thing in this context is that Trump understands war is terrible. Again, that's a good thing for a president to understand. And nuclear war is really, really, really bad. And that's a good thing for a president to understand. So that's basically coming into a world in which two parties who can't have a war that might destroy themselves, will have to find some other way. And I would say that's a promising start.
The thing is, so much has changed, even if you talk about it at a structural level in the last ten, 15 years. And this is where I want to bring in. Senator You've been in the Senate since 2010. You've seen how the relationship has evolved in the last ten, 15 years. Give us a sense, too, of how you yourself have seen that, and where you think, the road lies ahead. You've spoken about, you know, the need for both parties to coexist, to compete at the same time, but also to cooperate. Are you still optimistic that that is possible? And do you think, you know, in the US Senate and administration and beyond, there is hope of a bipartisan sort of, support for the three things that you spoke about.
Well, thank you. There is actually bipartisan support for a clear eyed engagement with China, strong support for our regional allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, and for taking the steps needed to further secure the United States and its position in the region. Unfortunately, I think President Trump's remarks tonight, his general approach and his conduct of the last year pulls in a different direction. The national security strategy does not correctly or clearly see China as it stands in relation to us in the world. And President Trump made clear tonight, as he's made clear in the last year, he doesn't have a fundamental appreciation that what has kept the United States strong and prosperous and secure, and what has largely kept the peace in Europe for 75 years, is a remarkable global network of allies who share core values and who are committed to building out a global order based on territorial respect, self-determination, freedom of navigation, rules of law, that sort of thing. President Trump, last year on Liberation Day, announced a chaotic mishmash of tariffs of wildly varying rates on all sorts of countries. I was in Taiwan not long before that, and, the Philippines and I've also visited with leaders in Korea and Japan right around that time, many of them making major investments in the United States in manufacturing, many of them doing their best to demonstrate to the Trump administration their interest in a closer alignment. And yet they were hit with 30 or 40 or 50% tariffs and had trouble understanding why and how and processing it. I think we need more predictable, more clear policy. President Trump believes strongly in national defense. He recently announced he intends to try and add another 500 billion to our defense budget. And that he thinks having the strongest military in the world is the thing that will help keep the peace. I do think a robust military is important, but I think the soft power side of things, if I could quote a great professor, is also important. And when we hand away what has been a 50 year advantage in our global leadership, in public health, in education, in combating climate change, in protecting against pandemics, when we say, nope, we're going to shut down USAID, we're going to cancel a lot of our core relationships. We create opportunities. So I do think that, there are opportunities for us to establish a framework to work with China. I do think the most pressing issue for all of us is AI and how AI will be used both in a military context and in business, and understanding each other in a mature, balanced and clear eyed way is a critical part of our advancing our security as well as the regions in the world.
I'll get back to the point about both countries being able to sort of cooperate on a tactical and issue specific basis, but but let's get back to that. Maybe I'll jump to Professor Zhao now and maybe make you do a few things. Firstly, your own take on the speech just now. And but also, how do you think, the Chinese government has is increasingly evolving its own thinking about, President Trump's approach, not just from this evening, but also on what has happened with Venezuela, with Greenland. And bearing in mind also April, the meeting in April, this this, this year, what do you think bearing all that in mind is a reasonable outcome that we can all expect in April?
Well, it's a lot to unpack. Thank you. Thank you. First, I think, I don't want to comment generally on President Trump's speech. I want to focus on the part where he mentioned China. Basically there are three times mentioned China, and you can see that that's generally the problem between us and China. The first time he mentioned China, he said there's no wind farm in China, which is totally false. It's but you can, you know, take that as a symbol that there's a general misperception of China. In the United States, there's less people traveled, less knowledge about China, particularly contemporary China. Second time when President Trump mentioned China. Basically, he said he wants to dominate AI and also crypto, leaving China, sort of outside the game or keep China, down. So that's the second problem where China believing win win cooperation in the United States only believe in zero sum. And the third problem, of course, if you look at that positively, President Trump, praised President XI and said he has good relationship with President XI. But the question was in which part US and China can cooperate. He stopped short of mentioning specifics. So that means other than personal sort of close relationship claims, there's no concrete agenda of cooperating with China. So I would appreciate, Senators Cohen's suggestion that we should establish a framework. And that's President Xi's suggestion that from the very beginning, we need to have guidelines, we need to have framework, but we also have needs to have mechanisms on every level to, you know, improve cooperation between the two countries. So back to your final question, which is what about April? Of course, the world is focusing on the April visits. And I think behind the scenes there are multiple connections. And just yesterday, the two economic teams had another talk with each other. So they're preparing for April and hopefully there will be concrete deliverables, deliverables out of that meeting. But right now from China's perspective, is that the President Trump is very much focused on his domestic domestic issues and basically expand its domestic issues into global issues like the Western Hemisphere on drug, immigration and all kinds of issues. And for China, his demand is on fentanyl, and China is willing to help. But don't know exactly where is the boundary. Like how can China provide more assistance. So, and also he demands China's purchase more. But when China wants to invest in the US, there's still no, parameter. Exactly how China can, like other countries, invest in the US. So there are many issues still on the table. There still needs to be ironed out exactly what to do next. But I think people's hopes are up. And, because next year, other than April, there will be other opportunities for President XI to visit the US and also G20, APEC. So hopefully this continuous dialogue between the two top leaders will maintain at least the stability of the bilateral relationship. And on top of that, we can, improve our strategic reassurance and having more trust between the two countries.
You know, the gentleman next to you, Ambassador Rudd, you have one of the most, intriguing and varied experiences as far as the US and China are concerned and US-China relations, even sitting from where you are now and by April you probably be be, in case you don't know, be observing things from a different perch. So as far as you are able, can you give us your perspective of what you think, would be a realistic outcome from April?
I think, to go to, the points made by my Chinese colleague and by Graham, Allison and Chris before me. The the core challenge is, is there a bilateral relationship management mechanism possible? And what is its framework? Either a you have what I've called for a long time managed strategic competition, accepting the reality of that competition, however uncomfortable politically sometimes that sounds in domestic audiences be unmanaged, strategic competition which can end in crisis, conflict and war. We'll see. You ultimately just stand back and wait for Graham's thucydidean logic to unfold with all of its problematic consequences. So, I mean, looking therefore at, those, general possibilities, what I sense, and this is me as a private scholar, not as ambassador in Washington, just thinking it through, one both sides at this stage exhibit an interest in stabilizing the relationship for different but partly overlapping reasons for the year ahead. I don't think you can project beyond that. And each has different reasons for doing that. Two, that therefore brings us down to the core terrain. Or how could you manage this? And on what issues which are real? There are the three T's, tariffs, technology and Taiwan. If you were to go to the core of where these interests, actually intersect and or run into each other, what is possible on those core three? I do not know. And in the United States side, I'm sure the Chinese side, including here in Davos, are working their way through at least the first two of those. The attitude from Beijing, because this is the sound of two hands clapping. It's not the sound of one hand clapping, is of itself obviously relevant. What I see underneath the Chinese posture towards not only the April summit, but more generally in the status of US-China relations is unprecedented levels of Chinese self-confidence. This is palpable. When you read the internal Chinese literature, it's transparent. When you read your people's daily, it's transparent when you read the theoretical literature, which the party engages in its own code, language communications with itself that, Dongyang, Zhejiang, the rise of the East and the decline of the West, which is a euphemism for the rise of China and the decline of the United States. So whereas China is in search of a stabilization arrangement, it actually, in its own internal political literature, believes its prevailing in this competition at present. So where does this land, given those overall dynamics, that is to be determined by a combination of Hurly Fung and Scott Bessent, who actually will be charged with the prep coms. But that, I think, is the terrain for the discussion and the options which are available.
But Angela, then to close us off, at least for now, do you think we are? And maybe I'll ask the question of of my other for colleagues as well. Do you think we're at a stage where there can be a at least an agreement to come to a sort of a guiding framework, for relations, or is it just a case of being able to work on it at a very tactical level, whether it's on issues like TikTok, for example, on a case by case basis. And on that basis, I think we emailed a little bit as well offline, that there may be some, space for some slight optimism that at least those issues can be taken care of. But what's your take on that?
Right? I mean, I'm a law professor. So when you mention the word agreements, I have the natural instinct in reaction to it. Right? So when you look at the potential deal that could be struck between two superpowers, it's very different from a basic contract that you see in a business dealings. Right. It will be a, you know, this kind of framework, right? I mean, whether you want it to be very broad or very vague or very detailed or concrete, it's very difficult to write this contract in the first place. You may recall back in the first trade war, during the first trimester, when the negotiations broke down, precisely because the two sides does not agree, did not agree on how to write a contract, right? Not to mention, even if you have a framework, how do you realistically enforce that contract? There's nobody above them to a third party neutral arbiter that could adjudicate that contract. So you will have to count on the parties themselves to sell, enforce that they will commit to this contract. Right. And that commitment is extremely difficult for a superpower, right, because there are all sorts of unforeseen contingencies that can arise along the way. So that commitment is very fragile. In this instance, however, I, I am, despite what I said, I am optimistic and I agree with Kevin that, at least in this year, we should expect more stability between these two countries than a year ago. Okay. And my optimism rests on three things. First, I think Washington has started to gradually realize that the containment policy, this kind of maximum pressure on China, hasn't worked very well. Right? I mean, from the first demonstration in 2017 till now, when you look at it, I mean, America's plan to slow down China hasn't really worked as expected. China have caught up very quickly. The technological gap has narrowed, right. If anything, it seems like the containment efforts have accelerated China's rise. Okay. So that's the first thing. And second thing is that thanks to the trade war and economic turmoil we have last year, the two countries now map out each other's chokepoints. They understand each other better. Right. And that is crucial because that eliminates a lot of the uncertainty and eliminate miscalculation. Right. They understand their own vulnerability as well as the other side's strength. Right. And and that eliminates, this that contribute to stability. And lastly, and I agree with Kevin on that point is I don't see either side have an appetite for, you know, instability because they have very strong incentive compatibility between them. Right? They both sides want stability in relationship. America is dealing with the midterm election. All eyes are on affordability fighting inflation China still struggling with economic slowdown. Want to address deflation. So one side wants cheaper import. The other side want more exports. So you definitely see room to for cooperation there. Yeah.
So before I go to questions then it would seem and maybe I'll get everyone else's view on this, is that the prospects of sort of a longer term landing point, which is the topic that we are talking about, is not necessarily realistic, but what we may have is a series of small landing points of, lowest hanging fruit in terms of maintaining a degree of stability, not just this year, but beyond. Is that approach that you think that both administrations, both governments, will take for at least a short term Professor Allison and then Senator Clinton.
In a word, I think, yes. So I think landing point, as if we had a permanent place to land is not, not likely. But I think, I agree completely with my colleague that if we look at 26 and you look at Xi's agenda and Trump's agenda, and you look at the experiences that they had in 25, where Trump basically tried to crush China with 145% tariffs. So again, bullying somebody that you can and, it turned out that she was not prepared to be bullied. And she tightened control of the supply line for rare earth products, threatening basically the American economy. And the two parties recognized we were entangled in a way that we're going to have to find a way to work together. And that's in the other realms of strategy would be called mutual deterrence and mutual deterrence, in which each of us can do significant harm to each other, has a certain stabilizing effect. Remember, it's because each are threatening to do something pretty horrible, so it's not a desirable state. It's more desirable than having confrontations. And it certainly reflects, I think, in this instance, some more realism in Washington about China now as essentially a full scale economic peer. And you can hear this criticism for people that don't want to wake up to that, criticizing Trump for being chicken, chickening out. So Taco became even a favorite, acronym. Trump always chickens out. Trump doesn't always chicken out. He only chickens out when confronting a stone wall or an equally, serious opponent who can do as much damage to him as he can do to them. So I'd say, what's the difference between the way he treats the Chinese and the way he treated the Europeans?
Senator Do you have a view?
I think it's important to stay clear eyed, that there are a significant number of tensions in the underlying relationship. Yes. We are economically very closely intertwined, more so than we've been with any other adversary. But increasingly aggressive PRC actions against and around the South China Sea. Really, compromising sovereignty of regional partners of ours, more and more aggressive actions towards Taiwan, crossing the middle line, deploying all the way around, sending an entire armada all the way around Australia. Unprecedented infiltration of our systems, our communication systems, the use of surveillance and other technologies to compromise security, cyber attacks, the fentanyl that was mentioned earlier. There's a whole range of things that are irritants in the relationship. We could stabilize it, if there were actions to reduce the irritants. I didn't even mention decades of intellectual property theft. We have had a tense and difficult relationship, partly because we have fundamentally different political systems, and partly because we've been at different stages of development. We are now economic peers and increasingly security peers. I'm always mindful that XI Jinping has directed the PLA to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, next year. The United States has invested a huge amount in modernizing military platforms that are specifically relevant to conflict in the Pacific. PRC is engaged in massive modernization across every possible domain, from space to nuclear to air to naval. And we need to do more to avoid that conflict. I don't think we've de-conflicted the possibility of accidents. When I was last flying over the South China Sea with Senator Ricketts on a bipartisan trip, it is clear that there is constant tension and risks for misunderstandings and mistakes, and there aren't enough lines of communication between our militaries. There aren't enough lines of understanding between our political leadership. There is widespread grievance on the part of Americans about the economic consequences for our middle class of globalization. Some of this is China's fault. Much of it is not, but it nonetheless drives a political narrative here in the United States. That means we are investing heavily in both trying to bring manufacturing back to the United States and being able to be clear that if there is a conflict to come, that we want to be prepared to win it. So we've got a lot of challenges if we're going to try and find, clear eyed accommodation lines of communication. The one that is most currently pressing is in the area that Kevin mentioned. We've talked about tariffs. We've talked about Taiwan a bit, but technology, AI is fundamentally changing how our world is, how work is. And if we've had a political earthquake in the United States because of globalization and the loss of middle class jobs that has produced political anger, AI is going to accelerate that dramatically. So China has the advantages of energy data, and skill talent that make them at least a peer competitor. In AI, we have chip design and chip manufacturing. This makes Taiwan doubly important. But as we race towards a world where AI is critical for everything from commercial productivity to defense and intelligence and surveillance, I support actions that restrict the speed with which China can take advantage of new AI models and technologies in order to threaten the United States and its core interests. Therein lies a very difficult thing to manage with the PRC. And if President Trump hands away the partnerships that we have built over decades with our allies and partners, I think we will live to regret it as a country.
So I'm going to ask you, yeah, would you like to respond to some of the things that you said?
Yeah, I'd like to, let me say, with all due respect, I wanted to talk about the whole story because, maybe from your American perspective, China's aggressive, assertive. But in many ways, China has been challenged. As you know, we just recently visited Taiwan. Taiwan's domestic political environment is worsening, and their repression of freedom of speech and arresting of people who dare to speak against the current, ruling party within Taiwan. And also China's response is always after when the pro-independence leadership in Taiwan trying to push forward with very radical agenda, which is a threat to both US and China security. So I think for both of us, we can reach certain, you know, create certain mechanism, reach certain strategic reassurance to maintain peace and stability in the region. But the precondition is that we need to also keep an eye on what they're doing within the island and trying to upset that possible, agreement between the two of us. And also in terms of Philippines, we had agreement with the previous government. The new government basically tear up the agreement. And that's why China has been moving forward, trying to deter further aggression. And also for other things you mentioned. I think in particular, I wanted to mention AI, which is, again, this is not a zero sum game. For me, this is, on the one hand, maybe a strategic competition like the ambassador mentioned. But I think this is a common challenge with the progress, with the fast leap forward of AI power, particularly with President Trump mentioned the establishment or the construction of data centers, there will be an AI that will threaten the common security of humankind, not just leaving the US outside or China outside. So I think, at this particular moment, we should reestablish government, government and also, you know, people to people talks on how to regulate AI, how to minimize its negative impact on both of our societies, and how to move forward with a constructive power of AI and try to control it.
Kevin, before I turn the floor to questions, I'm sure you've got responses and reactions to what you've heard so far.
No, we Australians are naturally, naturally quiet and conservative in their saying, the a few quick observations. One, I think we become obsessed in the collective West with endpoints as opposed to management mechanisms on the way through. It's a problem of, of Cartesian logic. I think we're drawn towards, Kantian idealist solutions as opposed to how we manage the pragmatic world on the way through. That's the first point. The second is if we look therefore, at what we're dealing with in the reality of US-China relations at the moment, we cannot mask the underlying fundamental differences in national interests which are here in the real world. I mean, number one, difference to, Zhuhai XI Jinping is not a status quo politician. He's not a. Boots that, you know, look at it domestically. Look at internationally. He wants to change the game. Number two, in terms of US China relations, what he wants in the Indo-Pacific is for China to have, a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, which advantages China rather than the current arrangements which advantage the United States. Number three, he does want to take Taiwan. That's clear. It's in the party's doctrine. It's political literature. It's every day and every week in the People's Daily and everywhere else. Number four, he wants to win the technology race in relation to the United States. You read the internal literature. It's very clear on that, in particular on the 5 to 10 enabling technologies of which the Crown jewels is artificial intelligence. And on top of that, he would like to prevail in the foreign policy narrative across the world as being the responsible force for globalization, both in the global South but also more broadly, the United States, with the exception of the last one, perhaps disagrees with each of those propositions. Under administrations of both persuasions. Therefore, that's the strategic reality we're dealing with. So I go back to my proposition endpoints in trying to achieve a magical consensus about those will not happen. You can either have a management mechanism which reduces the risk of crisis, conflict and war on the way through, anchored in deterrence. And as Graham said from the Chinese lens, mutual deterrence, perhaps, but certainly from the US and allied perspective, deterrence in order to preserve the strategic status quo management mechanisms around core interests South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan, plus, as well as working out where you can collaborate and have no holds barred competition in the rest and a mechanism, a machinery, perhaps, between Hurley Fung and Scott Bessent, and perhaps adding the national security officials who have comparable status in both systems to manage issues as they arise. Otherwise, it's like rolling the dice each morning and hoping it turns out okay by by midnight.
Once upon a time, there's a thing called a strategic and economic dialogue. Yes. And see what happened there, Angela. Yeah.
No, no, I'm not talking about that, because that became complete The it's just true. I mean, it just became. So it was bigger than Ben-Hur, for these things to work in Kissinger's day, who many of us knew, these things were done narrowly with the core group of officials who were strategically literate, capable of affecting decisions 2 or 3 in each side. That is not a 10,000 strong strategic and economic dialogue which goes on for eternity.
Let me just underline one point on on Kevin's, though. If you look at the as I've tried to study this over the period, if you look at the period, an, it's an essential element that the two leaders have enough of an understanding of each other about the rivalry and about the constraints on the rivalry. But that's not sufficient. There need to be then, at least 1 or 2 levels of their assistance who are in continuous, candid, private conversations about potential misunderstandings. Let me give a very good example. In the in the Biden administration, Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, and the foreign minister, Wang Yi, came to have a good enough communication network that whenever something was about to happen, they would talk about it and talk about it in advance. So they're not surprising each other and even talk about how it could be managed. So if you look at the difference between the Pelosi visit to Taiwan, which was a reckless action, in my view, by Speaker Pelosi, and in any case then produced a year of very bad relationship between the US and the alternative example, which was the the transit arrangement for President Ly. In the second case, the two governments privately talked in advance about how this could be disturbing to the two big guys, understanding that for them present Ly and Taiwan is a threat to produce an incident that would produce something that they don't want. So that's called diplomacy. In a world that works well. And unfortunately that has been slowed developing in the current relationship.
Yeah. I just have a very quick reaction to, the other speakers here. What I observed in the US-China power dynamics is that extremely fluid, right. So one country's strength can become its weakness and the other country's weakness can become its strength. I look at take a take an example of the chip ban, right? I mean, so because of the chip ban, the Chinese firm were not able to, you know, have access to abundant chips to train the models. But then that actually also forced them to become more innovative and more efficient in training the AI models. Hence, there is emergence of deep sea that completely change the technological landscape in China. And, you know, so that brings back a lot of confidence for for the Chinese economy. Right. And very recently, the Trump administration decided to relax control of the H200 to China. And despite a lot of criticisms in Washington, D.C., thinking, look, I mean, us selling nuclear weapon to the Chinese, right? I mean, however, look at how the Chinese respond. The Chinese doesn't seem very keen to buy these chips anymore. Right? So could you imagine one day there is a scenario that America actually want China to buy chips, just like how it wants it to buy soybeans. It's not a joke.
But but they are. wildly different in terms of their strategic consequence.
We have a lot of food for thought. So yeah, can I open it up to questions? And when the mic comes to you, just identify yourselves, please. And then address your questions. Me there first and then the next one in front.
So thank you very much. I'm the journalist from China's media. And in today's delegation, today's panel, we've mentioned Taiwan so many times. But tonight in this afternoon, I think the focus in the Congress hall is actually Greenland. So my question is that to what extent the potential transfer of control or sovereignty over Greenland can have a potential collateral or chain effect to the potential solution of Taiwan issues, or just following what Professor Allison has said, that if the two big countries and two troops do not have the voluntary intention to have a direct clash with each other, would it be possible for during the remaining three years of Trump's presidency? Would it would it be possible for Beijing and Washington to reach some diplomatic attacks on Taiwan? One to say, Beijing will not block US efforts to transplant at least 40% of the manufacturing of the advanced chips to, to, to, to, to the US, locally. But the US will give Beijing an ultimate say on Taiwan's political future, or at least to late. Beijing could be able to establish some guardrails for Taiwan's political choice. Yeah.
Who would you like to answer the question? Otherwise, I'll. Maybe I'll get Professor Zhao first.
Yeah. And ambassador and professor, please. Yeah.
Well, I would.
Say maybe professor.
One, one thing for certain, at least for me. So far, I have a game with one of my colleagues of this. This almost nothing that you can say that you come to me and you say, President Trump said this and I say it's impossible. It's inconceivable. This couldn't have happened. So he's very unpredictable and erratic. So and the spectrum goes, I think, from the floor to the to the sky. Okay. So one he could do. Secondly, I think that, both he and XI appreciate that Taiwan is a potential flashpoint for something that matters for the US and China. And, that's been a subject that was a subject of conversation in the first term, about which they had some understanding. And I think it'll be a subject as they going forward, I think they will see, Lai and his efforts to be as independent as he can be, as a threat to both of them and talk about it in something almost like those terms. So I could see before we're done here with the fourth communique, that would be much more, constraining. Now, what then would be a potential outcome? I don't know, I think that's an area for creative work by people in the in the world of diplomacy.
Professor, I'll make a quick response so we can get another question.
Professor Allison just mentioned what I want to mention. Maybe best case scenario is a false communique. But other than that, I want to talk about I want to set the record straight. Taiwan is part of China, so it's not up to whether China go out there and take Taiwan is whether the Pro-taiwan independence people wanted to separate Taiwan out of China. And that's the precondition for China to use force. That's the only reason, and the only thing that could initiate the use of Anti-secession law in China. And all the documents, historical documents point to and guarantee that Taiwan is part of China in terms of unified sovereignty. So I just want to say that. So because of that, whether previously when people wanted to use the president precedent of US kidnapping the president of Maduro from Venezuela, or the transfer of sovereignty of Greenland whatsoever cannot. It's not comparable to the Taiwan issue because, again, this is not a separate entity, separate, separate sovereignty issue.
We actually have run out of time. So I'm going to ask you to ask the last question. But make it such that each one of them can respond to your question, because that will be the recap. That will be the summarizing, because we've only got three minutes left. So please go ahead very quickly.
Namaskar. And good evening. I'm Ishan Pratap Singh from the Global Shapers New Delhi hub. As a 22 year old student of economics interested in the Thucydides Trap, Professor Allison's series trap, and, the grand strategy. My question is, with regards to the 19th century, there were two powers which had the opportunity to be seen as peers to Britain, and there was only the US remaining after the war. So my question is, how do you see the analogy to, the US in context of the 19th century, the analogy today? And what and if you see where I'm coming from, what is your position on India, with in the context of the 2047 target and the 2049 target of China? And this is a question for all of you. I think we're not.
Unfortunately, each one of them probably has 30s. So, Professor Allison, Kevin.
This is a great subject and a long period. I think it would be extremely interesting if India emerged as a serious third power, and that certainly conceivable. And if we were to do so over the next decade or two, this would change the dynamics in an interesting fashion. Similarly, if Europe emerged as a a powerful actor, this would again change the chessboard in interesting ways. And I think the reality that we've seen, especially as President Trump has behaved as he has, is that the chess board that we've been accustomed to is no longer going to be the, you know, the space for the future. So if we go back to the 19th century, that's an interesting case to try to think about. The rivalry between Great Britain and Germany. But we're at the same time. Russia is an extremely relevant power. So I think it's a good question and a good question for somebody who's 22 years old to think through, because there's a lot of a lot of space for work on that topic.
Thank you. Kevin.
There's a lot of talk. This builds on the question which has just been asked about spheres of influence. And it derives from a 19th century logic. All I would say is for those who are somehow implicitly assuming that the United States, under administrations of either political persuasions, are walking away from the, for example, the Indo-Pacific. Read carefully the national security strategy. That's the consensus position internally of the Trump administration. It is clear cut from that document, that the United States intends to remain the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, by extension of that, one of the first meetings which the Trump administration had after the inauguration 12 months ago was a quad foreign ministers meeting. I was there India, Japan, Australia, the United States, because this is seen as a core element in sustaining overall strategic balance in the wider region. And furthermore, in terms of India's long term role, its role within the quad, notwithstanding the bilateral tariff issues, which exists between Delhi and Washington and present, is of sustained strategic significance. And very finally, on Taiwan, on the succession law. Can I just add one point secession law? Yes. Is about Taiwan independence and independentists at one level, but its language says also says if insufficient measures are taken by Taiwan towards reunification, then military force is justifiable. That's a subjective equation, not an objective declaration of a yudai. Which brings me back to deterrence the way to sustain ultimate strategic stability in Indo-Pacific, uncomfortable as it is in the in the ears of many, is to sustain the logic of deterrence and the reality of it, including on the Taiwan question into the 21st century. And as Deng Xiaoping once said, allow these questions to be resolved in the fullness of time.
So if I could again let you conclude by maybe answering the question or not, and then I want to and then Senator
First, please, ambassador. Complete the sentence because the sentence says when all peace, peaceful hopes are depleted, that's when we want to use the military force.
But my point is, it's not simply a statement which says if Taiwan does a yudai.
It's actually got other quality clauses. That's just the reality. Yeah, I didn't say them all. But I want to turn back to India. I want first of all, India is rice is assured. With today's world and that again the rise of the East include India and many other developing countries, not just refer to China. So when India is rising and becoming a responsible major power in the world, again, I agree with the professor that will change the power structure of the world for the better, because Bric countries, when we collectively rising and speak, you know, representing the whole global South, I think that will change the global order and make it a better, fairer and more inclusive, order. And that's both. I think India and China wishes. Angela.
Professor, I will be very brief because we're running out of time. Professor Graham Allison, the book in 2017 has a provocative title called destined for War. I would change that. To summarize the theme of today's talk destined for peace in 2026.
Thank you very much. You're going to have to top that.
I'll briefly agree that the rise of India is a critical part of the strategic landscape of this century, and I'll agree that one area where there is urgency to the United States, China and many other countries coming up with a set of guardrails and plans is how to manage AI in a way that reduces the threats to all of humanity, and that unlocks its potential. We need to find ways to stabilize our relationship and ensure peace and security. In my view, that's been delivered for 75 years by a system and a set of rules. I do think XI Jinping has pushed against those rules and that stability hard, and we have challenging work to do to restore some of those clear expectations about what contributes most to peace.
Graham. Senator Angela. Kevin, thank you so much for the time.
Thank you.